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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-JURISDICTION OF A STATE COURT 
OVER A FOREIGN CORPORATION-Peninsular Gas Company, a Michigan cor-
poration, brought an action in Missouri against the plaintiff for breach of 
contract. A judgment was returned for plaintiff, and plaintiff immediately 
filed suit for malicious prosecution and served process on the president of 
the corporation who was in Missouri for the prior trial. On a motion to 
quash, held, sustained. Under the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution, the court had no right to assume jurisdiction. Defendant 
corporation was not doing business in Missouri, for bringing a prior law-
suit was a single isolated act and was not a part of its usual and customary 
business. Collar v. Peninsular Gas Company, (Mo. 1956) 295 S.W. (2d) 88. 
A satisfactory test for determining when state courts can exercise juris-
diction over foreign corporations must reconcile certain conflicting factors. 
These factors include the inconvenience to the corporation, the location of 
witnesses and other evidence, the physical and legal risks to citizens of the 
state because of the activities of the corporation, and the benefit to the 
corporation from being in the state.1 Each state may reconcile these factors 
1 See 104 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 381 (1955) for an extended treatment of these considera-
tions. See also O'Connor and Goff, "Expanded Concepts of State Jurisdiction over Non• 
Residents: the Illinois Revised Practice Act," 31 NoTR.E DAME LAWYER 223 (1956) for a 
defense of the new Illinois statute concerning jurisdiction, and a discussion of this balancing 
of interests. 
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in accordance with the considerations that it regards as significant, and 
may set up its own jurisdictional tests, limited only by the due process 
requirement of the United States Constitution.2 The constitutional extent 
of a state's power over foreign corporations is a question that has frequently 
been litigated. The early cases,3 following the rule applied in determining 
jurisdiction over natural persons, required that the corporation be present 
within the state. The difficulty of ascertaining the presence of a corporation 
in a state was resolved by requiring that the corporation be "doing busi-
ness" within the state.4 The Supreme Court's decision in International 
Shoe Company v. State of W ashington,5 the most significant recent case 
dealing with this question, leaves some doubt, however, as to whether "do-
ing business" is still a prerequisite to jurisdiction. In that case the non-
resident corporation had no permanent place of business within the state, 
but did have salesmen in the state who exhibited samples and solicited 
orders. The state court's jurisdiction was upheld in an action to recover 
state unemployment compensation contributions £or which the corporation 
became liable as employer of the salesmen. The Court, after reviewing 
prior decisions, concluded that no violation of due process would result 
from a state court's assuming jurisdiction over a foreign corporation so long 
as there were certain "minimum contacts" between the corporation and the 
state. Just what contacts will comprise the necessary minimum is not ob-
vious from the broadly-phrased opinion. Later interpretations of the deci-
sion by state and lower federal courts have produced two views. The first, 
followed in the principal case, regards the International Shoe case as merely 
an extension of the "doing business" test, and looks primarily to the factual 
situation in that case, viz., the fact that there were continuing acts within 
the state in pursuance of the usual business of the corporation.6 The second 
view, resting primarily on the language of the decision, treats the Inter-
national Shoe case as having_ done away with the "doing business" test, and 
instead allows jurisdiction whenever acts done within a state create the 
liability which gives rise to the litigation.1 While the United States Su-
preme Court has not yet passed upon the constitutionality of this second 
2 Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Schmidt v. Esquire, Inc., 
(7th Cir. 1954) 210 F. (2d) 908. Missouri law provides no particular standard for de-
termining jurisdiction over foreign corporations. Mo. Rev. Stat. (1952) §506.150 (3). See 
principal case at 93 for basis of this decision under the Missouri and United States Con-
stitutions. 
s Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. '714 at 733 (1877). See STOMBERG, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 2d 
ed., 7, 93-100 (1951); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws, 3d ed., 172, 186 (1949). 
4 St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913); International Harvester Co. v. 
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914). See 20 C.J.S. 45-62 (1940). 
5 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See McBaine, "Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations: Actions 
Arising out of Acts Done Within the Forum," 34 CALIF. L. REv. 331 (1946); 104 UNIV. 
PA. L. REv. 381 (1955); 12 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REv. 127 (1957). 
6 Goldstein v. Chicago R. I.&: P.R. Co., (W.D.N.Y. 1950) 93 F. Supp. 671 at 678. 
7 Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., (D.C. Md. 1950) 89 F. Supp. 654; Smyth 
v. Twin State Improvement Co., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A. (2d) 664 (1951); S. Howes Co. v. W. P. 
Milling Co., (Okla. 1954) 277 P. (2d) 655; Duraladd Products v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. 
App. (2d) 226, 285 P. (2d) 699 (1955). 
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interpretation, it seems unlikely that it would be held to violate due proc-
ess. Statutes in several states have expressly given their courts power to 
assume jurisdiction over a foreign corporation on the basis of a single lia-
bility-creating act.8 Reason itself seems to require that a state court be 
permitted to take jurisdiction of a controversy that arises directly out of 
acts within the state by agents of a foreign corporation where those acts 
are the primary issues of the litigation. In the principal case the suit for 
malicious prosecution arose directly from acts done within the state. All 
witnesses and evidence were present in Missouri, and notice was served on 
the president of the corporation within the state. A liability-creating act 
was done within the state, and under the second view of the International 
Shoe case, the Missouri court would be permitted to take jurisdiction. Apart 
from the possibility of jurisdiction based on the liability-creating act, it 
might also be argued that the defendant corporation consented to jurisdic-
tion of the Missouri courts. When a person brings a law suit within a state 
he submits himself to the jurisdiction of that state's courts for any cross-
action or set-off arising from that suit.9 In Adam v. Saenger10 the Supreme 
Court upheld jurisdiction over a foreign corporation on a cross-action filed 
three years after the original complaint. This suit arose in California 
where a cross-action has the position of an independent suit, and judgment 
may be obtained without waiting for the results of the original plaintiff's 
claim. The Court said the foreign corporation's voluntary act in demanding 
justice made it reasonable to treat the corporation as submitting to the 
court's jurisdiction for all purposes which justice requires. This implied 
consent concept might be extended to subject a foreign corporation which 
has brought suit within a state without probable cause to the jurisdiction 
of the courts of that state for purposes of determining the corporation's 
liability for malicious prosecution. The Missouri court in the principal 
case could have found jurisdiction either by a theory based on the existence 
of a liability-creating act or under a theory of implied consent. Since serv-
ice of process was entirely proper, the claim of its citizens for malicious 
prosecution could have been resolved economically and expeditiously. In 
view of the current trend for allowing broader jurisdiction, provided ade-
s Vt. Stat. (1947) §1562; Md. Code Ann. (Flack, 1951) art. 23, §88 (d); Ill. Rev. Stat. 
(1955) c. 110, §17. 
9 STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws, 2d ed., 82 (1951); CONFLICTS REsTATEMENT §§83, 88 
(1934). 
10 Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938). In Young Co. v. McNeal-Edwards Co., 283 
U.S. 398 (1931), a counter-claim was allowed against a foreign corporation although it was 
treated as a separate action. Holmes, J., speaking for the court, said at 400, " ... [P]lain-
tiff being already in court qua plaintiff by his own voluntary act, it is reasonable to treat 
him as being there for all the purposes for which justice to the defendant requires his 
presence." Gordy v. Levison &: Co., 157 Ga. 670, 122 S.E. 234 (1924), and Wachovia Bank 
&: Trust v. Jones, 166 Ga. 747, 144 S.E. 256 (1928), allowed jurisdiction over foreign cor-
porations for independent equity actions based on prior actions at law brought by the 
corporations. 
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quate notice is given,11 the Missouri Supreme Court probably has taken an 
unreasonably narrow view of the limits of due process as a test of jurisdiction. 
Robert L. Knauss, S.Ed. 
11 See note 1 supra. See also Joiner, "Let's H;i.ve Michigan Torts Decided in Michigan 
Courts," 31 MICH. ST. B. J. 5 Gan. 1952). 
